states are jointly and severally liable; 17 and fifth, they assume vicarious responsibility if acting through an international organisation (this is partially captured by the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO)).
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These solutions can be viewed from two perspectives. On the one hand, they can be viewed from the perspective of states that do not want to be held responsible for acts (or omissions) they did not commit (participation constraint of states), as has been held unerringly by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (which stated that responsibility may lead to noncooperation in peacekeeping missions). 19 On the other hand, they can be viewed from the perspective of the injured party. From the victims' point of view, it is always better to have joint and several liability (JSL) of the different actors. Not only does one not need to figure out exactly who is responsible (which is sometimes quite a tedious task, even for lawyers), but chances are that there is jurisdiction of some court on the issue and no immunities 20 (holding international actors responsible is difficult enough, and holding several actors responsible together rarely happens). In short, the risk of verification of who is responsible, the risk of insolvency, and so on, is shifted to the injurers. Nevertheless, JSL is not what is necessarily observed in international law. Also, it impacts upon the propensity of states to cooperate. How do the other possibilities fare? The best solution in most cases, and which may even lead to cooperation as a dominant strategy under certain circumstances, is under joint and several liability (JSL), the defendant is responsible for the whole harm but can ask other contributors to reimburse; under independent responsibility, the latter possibility does not necessarily exist. 17 JSL is most often compared or contrasted with an alternative rule usually called 'proportional liability' (or several only), on the one hand, or independent responsibility, on the other. 18 'it is unclear that the expected cost of potential rights violation liability would be enough to offset the benefits they currently reap from participating in peacekeeping missions'. For states, it is plausible that they do not want to assume responsibility neither ex ante nor ex post. For victims, one may argue that they prefer ex ante no responsibility fearing that otherwise states would not provide the public good (e.g. the peacekeeping mission). They might (subjectively) think they will not be hurt (e.g. somebody in a country where a peacekeeping mission arrives). But a rational individual (as assumed here), will always include the probability of being hurt against the utility of the cooperative venture by states. 20 See for the problems of process and jurisdiction Noyes and Smith, 'State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability', n. 6, 231 et seq., as well as Nollkaemper and Jacobs, 'Shared Responsibility', n. 4, 430 et seq.
proportional (or several only) responsibility, as compared with no, or independent, responsibility. JSL, from this perspective, lies in between independent and proportional responsibility, but it fares best from a victim's perspective.
Section 2 asks what goals a responsibility regime is intended to achieve. State responsibility, for example, modifies if and how a victim (a third party) can get compensation. Only clarity on those goals will allow us to conduct a comparative institutional analysis on the question of which responsibility regimes are adequate for certain problems and what trade-offs between different responsibility goals arise. Section 3 analyses how the norms on state responsibility currently accommodate multiple actors. The ARSIWA will be at the forefront of the discussion, since they are the default rules if no special treaty regime exists. Nevertheless, the current institutional framework cannot ignore the primary rules that are applicable: both primary and secondary norms are deeply intertwined when setting incentives for states. I will then describe the possible games being played by states when cooperating to provide public goods or to prevent public bads. The question is whether two or more states will cooperate under different apportionment systems in state responsibility. I will compare five such systems: no responsibility, proportionality (or several) responsibility, independent responsibility, JSL, and draw parallels for responsibility when states act through an international organisation. Game theory shows under which game a particular attribution role fares best to foster cooperation. This gives theoretical guidance on Article 47 of the ARSIWA, also for law-application (section 4). Section 5 will, first, elaborate on hypotheses on the circumstances under which states may assume joint and several liability, which is the best solution from a victim's point of view; second, make suggestions on how to overcome trust and commitment problems that might be responsible for the currently unsatisfactory state of state responsibility; and third, suggest other solutions where this might not be possible. Section 6 concludes.
Goals of the responsibility regime
Theories on responsibility (including state responsibility) can be analytical or normative, but this distinction is not clear-cut: whenever we try to understand why we have a certain regime in the first place (analytical; explanation of existing rules), those theories can be criticised or that states may consent to the rules -otherwise no cooperation would take place.
In contrast, non-instrumental theories posit that responsibility is better understood as a way of giving expression to certain moral or political principles (such as rights, duties, redress). 22 Ibid., at section 1.3.2. Whereas normative or philosophical approaches look for grounds for duties or rights, an instrumental perspective asks which duties we should have in order to have good consequences. For an excellent treatment of moral duties in shared responsibility constellations, see L. May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). We can then determine several goals of state responsibility. The first is reparation of the harm done (non-instrumental). Next are the preservation of peace via regulating the consequences of violations of international law; deterrence through the setting of incentives to adhere to international law and thereby reducing norm violations; loss allocation (that is, rational distribution of losses either between victims and responsible states or between different responsible subjects of international law); and administrative efficiency (that is, responsibility rules that are efficient and workable, and accessible for the victims). Last but not least, if the regime is a common enterprise for the common good (such as peacekeeping missions), the goal is to secure the cooperation of the states involved. 28 Note that if cooperation is not desired because it involves an unlawful activity in the first place, such as undertaking a war or an act of aggression, all arguments concerning the responsibility rules are reversed: the rule should be such that it hinders cooperation, i.e. independent responsibility fares best.
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In short, there are three main goals: first, to compensate the injured parties; second, to deter states from engaging in harmful actions in the future; and third, to secure international cooperation. Only the first two are usually mentioned in the legal literature; 30 the third is neglected -wrongly, in my opinion. Those goals cannot easily be achieved simultaneously.
As with reservations to treaties, the trade-off between two principles needs to be kept in mind:
on the one hand, the need of the international community to have states participating in treaties or joint actions (universality), and on the other hand, the integrity of the legal system by holding states responsible, and upholding the international rule of law by guaranteeing compensation of victims. In section 4, the Chapter will show under which institutional and factual conditions the trade-off occurs and how it could be mitigated. 35 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, 'Shared Responsibility', n. 4, at 397. 36 Pellet, 'The Definition of Responsibility in International Law', n. 34, at 9. 37 Ibid., at 8, 15, and 9: 'international law must be respected independently of the consequences of a violation and any breach entails the responsibility of its author, while the content of such responsibility, its concrete effects, varies according to whether or not the internationally wrongful act has caused damage, and according to the nature of the norm breached'. 38 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, 'Shared Responsibility', n. 4, at 401 et seq.
only one state is held responsible for the violation (conduct), although many states contributed to it: it could be held responsible for the whole harm (result), independently of its contribution.
The Commentaries specify that the responsibility of a state should not be reduced even if another state is also involved in the perpetration of the same wrongful act. 46 It is thus 39 They also do not distinguish between the source of obligation breached, be it crime, contract, or tort. for which full reparation must be made. This phrase clarifies that 'the subject matter of reparation is the injury resulting from and ascribable to the wrongful act, rather than any and all consequences flowing from an internationally wrongful act'. 71 Causality is a necessary and thus confining, but not a sufficient, condition for responsibility. The allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act is a normative and not only a historical or causal process. 72 Thus, whilst causality can set out limits to responsibility and also function as a criterion of attribution to allocate responsibility proportionally, this is not always possible to determine causality, and other criteria need to be used. 73 Which one that is depends on the issue area, and should ideally be dealt with in primary law.
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The proportionality rule is nevertheless in principle ideally suited to the task of resolving the problem of causal indeterminacy. Under this rule, the expected responsibility confronting the state equals the losses attributable to its illegal conduct. By giving states precisely the incentive needed to induce them to take optimal care, such a rule enables the system to achieve its optimal deterrence objective. 75 As will be shown, it is also the rule that best fosters cooperation between states.
Proportional responsibility can also be constructed in such a way that it comes into play only at the second stage, the allocation of losses. Here, in the first stage, independent responsibility would be found, but in the second stage, a state would only be responsible for the part attributed to it (via causality or otherwise).
71 ARSIWA Commentary, Article 31, para. 9, n. 44. 72 ARSIWA Commentary, Article 31, para. 10, n. 44. 73 As has been noted by Caron, 'The Basis of Responsibility', n. 66, at 153, 'causation as an aspect of State responsibility is, relative to municipal law developments, an undeveloped area of international law'. 74 In peacekeeping missions, it could be any form of command and control criterion; in climate change, it could be CO 2 emissions. 75 For details see Rosenberg, 'Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Cases', n. 25, for tort litigation in the United States. His analysis is equally valid for public international law.
Joint and several liability
Overall, explicit JSL is scarce in international law. 76 With regard to the second problem, if states are responsible concurrently for the actions of an international organisation, 108 we can refer to the cases where several states acted together. In the Tin Council case, for example, if the arguments of the plaintiffs had been followed, the outcome would have been that the member states were jointly and severally liable for their concerted action (the common business undertaking), even though they had acted through an international organisation. 109 But JSL is not necessarily the proper scenario -it would depend on how the internal distribution of responsibility is handled, and on the characteristics of the joint undertaking. There is no difference in the game structure compared to a situation where states act without an international organisation.
In the third situation, if states are responsible via secondary liability, this in principle does not change the structure of the incentives to cooperate in comparison with situations where states act in concert but without an international organisation, since again it all depends on the criteria for attribution between states. Thus we can refer to those instances from a game theoretical perspective, to which we will now turn.
What games do states play?
We turn now to one important goal of state responsibility: its impact on the propensity of states to cooperate in the first place. problems, since it highlights the underlying problem structure and motivations of the players.
In game-theoretic terms, state responsibility changes the pay-off structure of states and therefore their willingness to cooperate. In different games, which result from different underlying problem structures, the pay-off structure changes in various ways and thus generates different incentives to cooperate, as will be explained below.
The most important issue is to define the content of the pay-offs: this can be either only the loss of the parties from non-cooperation, or it can also be the externalities caused by non- 
Prisoners' dilemma constellations
A PD has an incentive structure which -without additional mechanisms -makes cooperation of states unlikely in the first place (without considering state responsibility). 117 If every player acts rationally individually, the collective outcome is sub-optimal. The game applies to any number of participants that seek a collective response to a problem in which the gain from reneging on one's commitment can give a defector a short-term advantage over cooperation. 118 In the following, the situations of a PD without responsibility (section 4.1.1), with independent responsibility (section 4.1.2), with proportional responsibility (section 4.1.3), and with JSL (section 4.1.4) will be discussed.
No responsibility
The pay-offs here depict only the gains from (non-)cooperation -the harm to third parties does not enter the pay-offs. This game is known from the so-called 'arms race' and is prevalent in many other constellations of cumulative action. How does the game look in a world where no state responsibility exists (or there is no injured party claiming)?
119 Although cooperation has a higher pay-off for both states, both of them will defect, no matter what the other state does (the pay-off of 4 of defection is higher than the pay-off of 3 for cooperation). The dominant strategy for each state is defection; there is a unique equilibrium -defection, defection -and therefore, states will not cooperate (in a one-shot game). They end up in the cell with a pay-off of 2 for both (Nash equilibrium), 121 although they could have achieved a pay-off of 3 for both, if cooperating. In the PD the equilibrium is thus noncooperative, with pay-offs (2,2). There are many mechanisms that can solve this social dilemma: once a game is repeated (open-ended), the pay-off matrix may change, since the pay-off of defection declines and the pay-off of cooperation rises due to reputational effects.
All this has been widely researched in international law and international relations. 122 What is the problem with failing to ensure that there is cooperation? From the perspective of the parties, the problem is that each of them loses 1 (3-2=1), and thus the total loss of the parties is 2, i.e. only the loss of non-cooperation -harm to third parties is not included.
Independent responsibility
How do the incentives change once responsibility exists and externalities to third parties are taken into account? The role of state responsibility (and the different rules of apportionment)
has not been investigated, although sanctioning has been proposed as a mechanism to overcome the social dilemma. 123 There is an additional social loss that the parties do not take into account if there is no responsibility (for instance, a loss for other victims of pollution).
But this is relevant if state responsibility exists. Typically, the amount to be paid is somewhat related to the loss. We are interested in the amount of compensation (denoted X). 124 Note that the higher is X, or the expected compensation E(X), 125 the smaller is the pay-off from cooperation for the states. Every payment of compensation thus diminishes the expected pay-121 A Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy. 124 X > 2 if the punishment is larger than the actual damages. But we could also have X < 2, if for some reason there is under-compensation. This is, in turn, crucial because the equilibrium under the various rules depends on X, but for reasons of simplicity we assume that X is the exact amount of damage done to third parties. 125 E(X) = expected compensation (i.e., the probability of having to pay the whole claim * X). E denotes that we deal with expected compensation, which is subjective (whereas X only is objective). For simplicity, all states have the same subjective probability of being held responsible in case of independent responsibility: they do not know whether they or another state will be held responsible. Note that this is different for proportional responsibility where a half/half split is assumed for simplicity, and thus E is not needed (X is objective). This might not hold in practice since, for example, states with deep pockets are more likely to be sued. In this case, expected damages might surpass the contribution to the damage, and from the perspective of that state, the game turns into a trust game.
off of states. Let us now turn to independent responsibility, where a state can be held responsible for the whole harm to third parties independent of its contribution. 
The dominant strategy is defection if E(X)<1 (small expected damages); the game then shows a unique equilibrium -defection, defection. Therefore, states will never cooperate if they face the risk of being held responsible for the whole harm, even if they did not cause it.
But if E(X)>1, where there is a high expected compensation, 126 then the game becomes a trust game (it has two equilibria). This is counterintuitive and may be explained by the fact that the stakes are so high (i.e. state responsibility as a sanctioning device) that it is better to cooperate. There are thus two equilibria, depending on the expected responsibility to third parties. This can easily be seen because responsibility reduces the pay-off uniformly in all cases except the case of cooperate/cooperate. Therefore, it does not change the decision of, say, state I under the assumption that state II defects: state I's pay-off when it cooperates, and state I's pay-off when it defects, go down by the same amount. So defection remains a best response to defection by the other party. But if state II cooperates, than the rule makes the pay-off of state I with cooperation higher than its pay-off with defection. Therefore, cooperation is now state I's best response to state II's decision to cooperate. So cooperate, cooperate is also an equilibrium.
To summarise: if the expected damages are small, defection remains the dominant strategy. If the expected damages are large, the game turns into a trust game with two equilibria: that is, the behaviour of states is indeterminate. Higher expected sanctions thus augment the propensity to cooperate.
Proportional responsibility
The game changes in the case of proportional apportionment:
127 Where there is proportional apportionment, the dominant strategy is cooperation if, and only if, X>2. 128 There is thus a unique equilibrium -cooperation, cooperation (3,3). Therefore states will always cooperate. Note, though, that this holds only if the expected reparation is higher than the gains from defection. In this case, proportional responsibility is always better than independent responsibility, since states will always cooperate (because there is only one equilibrium). We can expect X to be very high (larger than 2) in, for example, climate change constellations. But if 1<X<2, then the game becomes a trust game with two equilibriadefection, defection, and cooperation, cooperation -and equals, from the cooperation viewpoint, independent responsibility with large damages.
To summarise: if the expected damages are high, states will always cooperate under proportional responsibility, whereas this is not assured under independent responsibility. If the expected damages are very small (X<1), they will defect, since then we are close to the pay-offs of the game without responsibility. If expected damages are in the middle range (1<X<2), the game is indeterminate, since there are two equilibria and it turns into a trust game. All then depends on the expected behaviour of other states.
independent responsibility or to proportional apportionment depends on the probability of recovering the 'overpaid' share from the other states. Depending on the indemnity rule between the states, JSL is closer to independent or proportional responsibility. If that rule is zero (or is de facto zero), it is similar to independent responsibility; if the rule is 100 per cent, it equals proportional apportionment. The latter case is unlikely, however, since we can expect recovery to involve costs, whether diplomatic costs or costs of dispute settlement and enforcement. Thus JSL is never as good as proportional responsibility from a cooperation perspective (although not under the compensation perspective).
Trust game constellations
Let us turn to cooperative ventures of states where they come together for concerted action.
At the forefront of international cooperation is trust: 'the nature of many risks requires cooperation, coordination, and trust between a range of stakeholders who have diverging interests and different perceptions of the (potential) risks involved.' 130 We define risk here as the risk, first, of being held responsible that the cooperative outcome is not achieved; and second, of being attributed the wrong caused by other players in the game. I submit that international cooperation in common tasks is best illustrated by a trust game. 131 While in a PD there is a conflict between individual rationality and mutual benefit, in a trust game, what is rational for one player to do depends on his or her beliefs about what the other will choose.
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The game describes a conflict between the risk of responsibility for actions the state did not cause (or omissions it did not commit), on the one hand, and the desire for social gains by cooperation, on the other. The stag hunt game models the underlying problem structure of the strategic interests of the players: rational agents are pulled in one direction by considerations of risk of responsibility, and in another by considerations of mutual benefit expected from 129 Again, for reasons of simplicity, it is assumed that that E(X) is the same for all parties: that is, the damages are split half/half. Surely, if one country is more solvent, that country will be targeted first. Other considerations might make the probabilities different: media damage, internal politics, ability to fight back, fear of retaliation, etc. If the chances to recover from other countries is zero, this will shift JSL close to independent responsibility: that is, if a party bears the full X and the other bears nothing, then that party will always choose to defect. cooperation. 133 The game was first described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Two individuals go out hunting and each hunter can choose to hunt either a stag (deer) or a hare, the hare being worth less than the stag. Neither knows what the other hunter will do. If they both concentrate on hunting the stag, they will gain a bigger price, but they need the cooperation of the other. If each hunter assumes that the other hunter may not cooperate, they will choose to shoot the hare in order to ensure having meat on the dinner table. 134 It all depends what one player thinks the other player will do. Trust is often not present, which hinders cooperation in the first place: this is the so-called 'social dilemma'. In this case, states will prefer to play a lone hand, although they would gain from cooperation and/or delegation to an international organisation.
Rational players can coordinate on the stag hunt (not choosing the hare hunt), which gives them a better pay-off, but they need a measure of trust to do so. Several dynamics can lead to a Nash equilibrium in which the players hunt the stag (and are thus better off). Most of the trust dynamics tested in experiments are independent of institutions. 135 But trust problems can be solved by many means, such as by having a central government (reliable enforcement), by creating network structures (as in e-bay sellers' ratings), long-term relationships, 136 and a reputation for being trustworthy. 137 As Lenin stated long ago, 'trust is good but control is better'. In game-theoretic terms, the term 'control mechanisms' refers to the possibility of punishing or rewarding a partner in subsequent transactions in repeated trust problems.
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Thus we also find institutional structures that punish defection: 139 state responsibility as a sanctioning device is one of them.
In the following, the situations of a trust game without responsibility (section 4.2.1), with independent responsibility (4.2.2), with proportional responsibility (4.2.3), and with JSL (4.2.4) will be discussed.
No responsibility
Let us look at the structure of the game situation without any responsibility. If one player thinks that the other one will not cooperate, he or she is better off when playing alone (hunting the hare: pay-off of 1, because he or she would end up with nothing (0) if they did not do so). They would end up hunting the hare (pay-off of 1,1). Only if they believe that the other player will also concentrate on hunting the stag will they do so and catch the stag (3,3). Two equilibria exist in this game, and which one is chosen depends on trust; it therefore depends on what one player thinks the other player will do.
Independent responsibility
Let us look first at independent responsibility, which carries the risk of being held responsible for harm to third parties caused by other states. 
the anticipation of behaviour of the players in the future, while learning is based on information obtained from the players in the past.
Cooperation (stag)
0-E(X),1-E(X) 3,3
Under this condition there is no dominant strategy. There are two equilibria in pure strategies -defection, defection; and cooperation, cooperation. 140 Which one is chosen depends on trust, as in the situation without state responsibility. Therefore, it depends on what a state thinks the other state will do -here, trust-creating mechanisms, apart from state responsibility, come into play. With independent responsibility, the trust game always remains a trust game (two equilibria), irrespective of the expected damages. Note the difference with the PD situation, where under independent responsibility the game turns into a trust game only if E(X)>1;
otherwise defection is the dominant strategy.
Proportional responsibility
Let us look at proportional apportionment, where I again assume a half/half splitting of responsibility without loss of generality. 
The dominant strategy is cooperation if, and only if, X>2. 141 We then have a unique equilibrium -cooperation, cooperation (3,3). With proportional apportionment, states will thus always cooperate, even in the absence of trust. If X<2, the game remains a trust game with two equilibria; again, trust is crucial for cooperation. Note that if damages are high, there is no difference between a PD and a trust game under proportional responsibility: both lead to cooperation as a unique equilibrium.
140 This is because 1-E(X) is always > than 0-E (X), and 1-E(X) is always < 3. Thus it does not matter how high the expected damages are; the structure of the pay-offs remain unchanged. 141 X again denotes compensation to third parties. This follows from: 0 > 1-X/2, which implies X>2; and 3 > 1-X, which implies X>-2.
Joint and several responsibility
For JSL, the same reasoning applies as in the PD: it depends on the probability of recovery as to whether the JSL situation resembles the proportional or the independent apportionment.
Summary of the findings on cooperation of states
Assuming that cooperation is desirable, there is thus a clear ranking of outcomes. The first best is cooperation/cooperation; the second best is indeterminate with two equilibria depending on trust; and the third best is defection/defection. In a world without responsibility, in cases of cumulative action, states will not cooperate, whereas in cases of concerted action it depends on their mutual trust. We can now distinguish between two situations: one with high damages and one with low damages.
In PD situations -that is, situations of cumulative action -we can show a clear ranking:
independent responsibility will lead to non-cooperation if the harm is not too high. In contrast, if the harm is very high and the state risks being held responsible for the whole damage, it is unclear whether states will cooperate. This is counterintuitive and can be explained by the effect of punitive damages. Then the costs of non-cooperation can become higher than the costs of potential responsibility, and the game changes into a trust game. In the case of proportional liability, states will always cooperate if damages are high, and thus it is better for cooperation than independent responsibility. Where damages are intermediate, the game changes into a trust game with two equilibria. Only if damages are very small will states defect, and the situation will be the same as if there were no responsibility. JSL may thus work either way: if damages are high and/or recovery from other states is likely, then cooperation is more likely, since the structure is similar to proportional responsibility with high E(X). If damages are low and/or the probability of recovery is low, cooperation is not secured, since the structure is more similar to independent responsibility. All thus depends on recovery from the other states, and it can cut both ways: in the direction of either independent responsibility (no recovery) or proportional responsibility (perfect recovery).
Let us turn to instances of concerted action; that is, a trust game. Having 'no state responsibility' or having 'independent responsibility' changes nothing in terms of cooperation (it all depends on trust), but 'proportional responsibility' surely leads to cooperation.
Assuming that the third party victim is always compensated, then 'proportional' responsibility strictly dominates 'independent' responsibility -that is also intuitively convincing in the case of high damages. If the likelihood of the third party victim being compensated changes to zero (e.g. because there is immunity), this amounts to a system without state responsibility, and cooperation depends on trust. In concerted action constellations, contrary to a PD, other trustgenerating mechanisms can be used to solve the cooperation problem, independently from state responsibility.
Table 7: Summary of Consequences of Responsibility Regimes for Cooperation
The game theoretical analysis could show that it may impact the propensity of states to play the game in the first place if responsibilities are assigned in a way that a player is subject to responsibility above and beyond the harm caused by that violator's unlawful conduct. That is, independent responsibility, especially in low damages situations, is worse than proportional responsibility. A perfect JSL situation with full recovery sets the same incentives for cooperation as proportional responsibility. Apart from sovereignty concerns, incentive problems may thus militate against norms on state responsibility, which would hold all states either independently responsible for the whole, or jointly and severally liable (with less than full recovery) for the risk that third parties are hurt (as in peacekeeping missions). In trust 
The trade-off problem from a political economy perspective
We can now judge the current state of state responsibility. The first criticism is that not one size fits all -as we have seen, it is necessary to distinguish different constellations in the primary law (which deals with different problem structures). 142 Clearly, the first best option is to be able to draw on ex ante arrangements that states would need to agree before acting together as to how to distribute responsibility ex post. 143 Surely the ARSIWA and the ARIO give some guidance, but they also leave space for filling those gaps in cases of shared responsibility; thus a tribunal should have some guidance as to how to apply Article 47 of the ARSIWA. 144 The following analysis is intended to provide such guidance, showing the tradeoffs of the goals (section 5) when determining responsibility. First, the trade-off problems will be described (section 5.1); second, potential solutions will be shown (section 5.2).
Trade-off between the different goals of state responsibility
As set out in section 2, three main goals of the law of international responsibility can be From a compensatory perspective, there are good grounds for finding JSL; it is the first best option from the perspective of the injured party. 145 Under JSL, a litigant can claim against one defendant only and recover the whole reparation from that one defendant, regardless of how many other defendants are also responsible for the damage. It is sufficient for the claimant to identify one or more parties that are responsible for the same loss. That defendant might then -with a limited probability -recover from other defendants ex post but it has to bear ex ante a disproportionally large share of the burden. JSL can (but need not) provide an indirect path to proportional liability, provided all defendants are available and able to pay. 146 The risk of recovery is shifted to the defendant states, away from the injured parties. 147 One joint tortfeasor then serves as an 'insurer' of another. 148 States can be hold jointly and severally liable only if their concurrent acts brought about the harm to the injured party. The acts of the defendants do not have to be simultaneous: they must simply contribute to the same event. For example, assume that one state diverts a river and another one later pollutes it. Together this leads to a disruption of water supply for a third state. JSL is applicable in both instances of cumulative and concerted action. The classic reason the law imposes joint liability is when the harm is 'indivisible', in order to deter wrongdoing by those acting together. 149 JSL thus shifts the risks of recovery and the burden of proof of attribution to the defending states (away from victims). Although that fosters the first goal (reparation), it impacts upon the third (cooperation). This was clearly stated in the submissions of governments in the Behrami and Saramati case. 150 On the one hand, it gives states an incentive to monitor each other, since they might be held responsible for each other;
on the other hand, it might promote shirking by states in case they expect not to be responsible for the full costs of their behaviour. Depending on the recovery probability and the ability to monitor, it may thus inhibit cooperation. In cases of concerted action (a trust game), control mechanisms are much easier to institutionalise than in instances of cumulative action (a PD situation) and, thus, cooperation is more likely in the former constellations, even under JSL. Also in cases where trust is present, JSL might mitigate the participation constraint problem depending on the recovery possibilities. JSL is therefore a second best option (in comparison with proportional responsibility) from an incentive point of view of states, but a first best option from the victims' perspective.
Independent responsibility is clearly, from a state's perspective, the worst outcome, and would inhibit the propensity of cooperation in the first place, since the pay-off of cooperation would be potentially diminished to a great extent (although more so in PD than in trust games). From a victim's perspective, independent responsibility is a second best outcome after JSL, since it just needs to identify one violator and can pick the one which, first, is accessible in courts, and second, has deep pockets.
Under proportional responsibility, the plaintiff has to identify all the defendants and claim a proportionate share from each of them. It requires the plaintiff to claim and prove a percentage or share of their loss from each defendant, who may of course contest both the attribution to them and the appropriate share. This is difficult and sometimes impossible for plaintiffs. Under proportional liability the share allocated to an insolvent or absent defendant cannot be recovered by the plaintiff unless there is a further rule to re-allocate uncollectable shares. What is important here is that under proportional responsibility, the risk of who should bear the cost of the loss, and also who bears the risk of a defendant not paying, is shifted to the claimant, thus impacting upon the first goal of compensation, but it secures cooperation of states much better, as has been shown above.
To summarise: whenever possible, from a compensatory perspective, JSL is best; independent responsibility is second best; and proportional responsibility is the worst. In contrast, from a cooperation point of view, responsibility should be attributed to the state directly and proportionally. Furthermore, only when actors take responsibility for their actions will incentives in the institutional setting be such that harm will be avoided (the second goal of deterrence). Acting without consequences does not usually get the incentives right: neither for the level of activities, nor for the scope of negligence or willful acts (although the latter considerations are immaterial in the ARSIWA). 151 Furthermore, only if the other actors trust their cooperative partners to abide by the law will they cooperate. Moreover, states will not easily assume independent responsibility for their joint actions, since they would otherwise run the risk of being held responsible (solely for the whole violation, or jointly and severally) for something they did not do or could not control. This calls for using proxies in order to be able to determine proportional responsibility, for example the share of CO 2 emissions. Another solution is to shift the burden of proof 153 of attribution from the victim to the joint tortfeasors or to the international organisation under which umbrella they acted. But states will not easily consent to treaties or joint actions if they risk bearing responsibility for actions of other states. I will outline instances where states are more likely to agree to JSL, since it is best from a compensatory perspective, and some institutional suggestions for dealing with shared responsibilities in international law.
Institutional suggestions
Let us turn to the case of cumulative but independent action of states (the PD situation).
Although states might have agreed through a treaty to achieve a common goal (like sustaining fisheries), 154 country involved has an interest in participating in the common enterprise; the expected benefit from the joint activity is often greater than the risk of being held liable for the actions of another state. Second, in instances of strict liability for states (usually liability for lawful behaviour), it is more likely that they will also consent to JSL, since the potential negligent behaviour of other states, which is usually very difficult to detect and verify, does not play a role. 158 Third, the smaller the project (in scope, time, and potential damages), the more likely it is that states will consent to JSL, since the behaviour of other cooperating states can be better monitored and controlled. Also, trusting on the basis of a small sum is easier than trusting on the basis of a potentially undefined large sum for reparations. Fourth, the cooperation needs to be well-defined in scope. The clearer the definition of the common task, and the more controllable it is, the higher the likelihood that there will be consent to JSL. This is what we see, for example, in the Liability Convention, since launching a space object is an activity that is well-defined in scope. Fifth, the closer the cooperative relationship is between the states, the higher the degree of trust and the greater the likelihood they will agree to JSL. This is, for example, the case in the LOSC. The JSL foreseen in Article 6 to Annex IX of the LOSC was written with the EU in mind. The EU can be presumed to be an international organisation with a considerable amount of trust between its members, compared to other international organisations.
It is also possible to introduce caps on responsibility if states cooperate through a treaty (or a soft-law agreement, as in peacekeeping). This could be combined with an 'insurance mechanism' through an international organisation, and would change pay-offs accordingly. 158 Kornhauser and Revesz, 'Joint Tortfeasors', n. 151.
Another possibility is to create funds ex ante to compensate victims or to create insurance solutions, as is already done in the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, which provides for mandatory insurance for tanker owners.
159
If states act under the auspices of an international organisation (as in peacekeeping missions), the responsibility should be shifted to the international organisation; JSL is more problematic due to the participation constraint of states. 160 It can be assumed that delegating the monitoring and control task to a third actor (the international organisation) will mitigate the trust problems between the participating actors. The international organisation usually has the best information on the attribution problems and is also the cheapest insurer; it might also have the best control over participating states. The Civil Liability Convention was adopted to ensure that adequate compensation is available to persons who suffer oil pollution damage resulting from maritime casualties involving oil-carrying ships. The Convention places the liability for such damage on the owner of the ship from which the polluting oil escaped or was discharged. Subject to some specific exceptions, the liability is strict; it is the duty of the owner to prove in each case that any of the exceptions should in fact operate. However, except where the owner has been guilty of actual fault, they may limit liability in respect of any one incident. The Convention also requires ships covered by it to maintain insurance or other financial security in sums equivalent to the owner's total liability for one incident. 160 See Behrami and Saramati, n. 19, para. 149: '[i]n the present case, Chapter VII allowed the UNSC to adopt coercive measures in reaction to an identified conflict considered to threaten peace, namely UNSC Resolution 1244 establishing UNMIK and KFOR. Since operations established by UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are fundamental to the mission of the UN to secure international peace and security and since they rely for their effectiveness on support from member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a manner which would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which are covered by UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to the scrutiny of the Court. To do so would be to interfere with the fulfilment of the UN's key mission in this field including, as argued by certain parties, with the effective conduct of its operations.' 161 See for a refined analysis on different situations in peacekeeping, especially the control criterion, Dannenbaum, 'Translating the Standard of Effective Control', n. 19.
international organisations is to prevail in courts, then at least it is a call to continue developing claims commissions that can handle the victims' cases. How those can and should be designed to fulfil the criteria of the rule of law and access to justice must be left open here.
In short, a really centralised coordinator, such as an international organisation, is rare in international law, but it may not only solve the trust problem but also the responsibility problem, because then the international organisation could be held responsible for insufficiently fulfilling its tasks. Also, the international organisation could be held responsible if it used private operators, even if internally; it could recoup damages it paid to third parties, based on contracts. The question, then, is what mechanisms can be created, first, to enhance trust even more, and second, to create clear responsibilities internally, but this must be left to further research.
Outlook
Global problems, and therefore the provision of global public goods, are becoming ever more prominent -and with those problems, so does the need for global cooperation. Whereas social
scientists ask under what circumstances states cooperate, lawyers ask inter alia who is responsible when something goes wrong and the public good is either not provided (such as climate change mitigation), or it is provided, but simultaneously third parties are injured (such as in peacekeeping missions). This Chapter was a first attempt to bring those two strands of thought together by asking how shared responsibility impacts upon the propensity of states to cooperate in the first place. Depending on how state responsibility is designed, the participation constraint of states in cooperative ventures comes into play. If international cooperation is desirable, one needs to take this constraint into account. It therefore seems reasonable to look at the game that states (and other actors) are playing when collaborating.
While the compensation perspective has been rightfully considered, the other side of the equation needs to be taken into account as well, by using state responsibility as explanans for the propensity of states to cooperate in the first place. Grosso modo, if cooperation is desired, independent responsibility is not the best solution. Article 47 of the ARSIWA should be interpreted in a way that allows, if it is possible in any way, for proportional responsibility or JSL, with the possibility of recourse in order to accommodate the victim's perspective.
the common undertaking itself (hunting the stag as such, not the individual action) is unlawful (such as a common invasion of a third country), JSL or even independent responsibility for the whole harm (as in the ARSIWA) should be found for deterrence reasons, since it destabilises the unlawful relationship. This reasoning is well-known from competition law or fighting corruption, but it also applies to the desired hindrance of cooperation of states.
While this Chapter is a first attempt to explore the impact of state responsibility norms on the cooperative behaviour of states, further elaboration on the exact circumstances and institutional features is surely needed.
